Windows Vista, ASLR, DEP and OEMs

[peat moss]

http://img335.imageshack.us/img335/6251/msvistanew3bh.gifAs I mentioned in a previous series of posts, we recently had all the major OEMs on campus to discuss SDL and how we can work together. My big ask of the OEMs (actually, I grovelled, it was pathetic) was to enable DEP/NX in the BIOS by default on all their shipping PCs in time for Windows Vista.

The reason for this ask is pretty simple, for ASLR to be effective, DEP/NX must be enabled by default too.

Here's the good news, I found out yesterday that all the major OEMs (you know who they are!) have agreed to not disable DEP/NX in their BIOSs by default .

:source: Source: http://blogs.msdn.com/michael_howard/archive/2006/12/06/windows-vista-aslr-dep-and-oems.aspx

[peat moss]

ASRL = Address Space Layout Randomization in Windows Vista

Windows Vista Beta 2 includes a new defense against buffer overrun exploits called address space layout randomization. Not only is it in Beta 2, it’s on by default too. Now before I continue, I want to level set ASLR. It is not a panacea, it is not a replacement for insecure code, but when used in conjunction with other technologies, which I will explain shortly, it is a useful defense because it makes Windows systems look “different” to malware, making automated attacks harder.


Link :

http://blogs.msdn.com/michael_howard/archive/2006/05/26/address-space-layout-randomization-in-windows-vista.aspx