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j2k4
07-09-2003, 01:37 PM
This is not a slam of the Clinton administration (that's too easy).

Ijaz was, at one point, a supporter of Clinton; he campaigned and raised funds for him.


April 28, 2003, 8:45 a.m.
The Clinton Intel Record
Deeper failures revealed.

By Mansoor Ijaz



The unearthing of documents directly linking Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda organization to Saddam Hussein this weekend may have hermetically sealed the Bush administration's case that dismantling Iraq's Baathist enterprise was in part necessary to undo terrorism's dynamic duo. But closing that case may reopen a Pandora's box for ex-Clinton administration officials who still believe their policy prescriptions protected U.S. national interests against the growing threat of terrorism during the past decade.

The London Telegraph's weekend revelations raise deeply disturbing questions about the extent and magnitude to which President Clinton, his national-security adviser Samuel R. "Sandy" Berger, and senior terrorism and State Department officials — including Assistant Secretary of State for East Africa, Susan Rice — politicized intelligence data, relied on and even circulated fabricated evidence in making critical national-security decisions, and presided over a string of intelligence failures during the months leading up to the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania.

Analysis of documents found in the rubble of Iraq's intelligence headquarters show that contrary to conventional wisdom, Iraqi military and intelligence officials sought out al Qaeda leaders, not the other way around, and ultimately met with bin Laden on at least two occasions. They also show that channels of communication between al Qaeda and Iraq were created much earlier and were wider ranging in scope than previously thought.

The timing of the meetings sheds important new light on how grave the Clinton administration's intelligence failures may have been.

On February 19, 1998, about six months prior to the attacks in Dar Es Salaam and Nairobi, Iraqi intelligence officials set in motion a plan to bring a senior and trusted bin Laden aide to Baghdad from Khartoum. One of the key Mukhabarat intelligence documents shows that a recommendation was made for "…the deputy director general to bring the [bin Laden] envoy to Iraq because we may find in this envoy a way to maintain contacts with bin Laden." The meetings took place in March 1998.

The initial program to have the terror talks last for one week was extended to two because of the success in whatever nefarious plans were being hatched. The meetings also laid the groundwork for Iraq's former intelligence chief, Farouk Hijazi, arrested last Friday in Iraq, to meet with bin Laden in December 1998 in Afghanistan. Press reports also chronicled an earlier meeting between Hijazi and bin Laden in Sudan in 1994.

Baghdad, however, was not the only game in town. While Saddam was busy trying to find a formula for embracing and employing al Qaeda's budding global terror network to attack U.S. interests, Sudan was busy trying to alert Western intelligence officials — including those at the National Security Council, the State Department's Terrorism Bureau, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Central Intelligence Agency — of the dangers still lurking in Khartoum's sandblasted neighborhoods after bin Laden's May 1996 expulsion.

A brief chronology demonstrates how compelling the Sudan's offer to turn over terrorism data might have been in thwarting attacks on U.S. citizens and assets overseas, and how mendacious a narrow clique of Clinton officials were in not taking advantage of those efforts.

OCTOBER 27, 1996. In a confidential memorandum I wrote to Sandy Berger to follow up on the August 1996 meeting he and Susan Rice (then a National Security Council official) had called me to the White House for to discuss U.S.-Sudan relations, I recounted events of my first meeting with the new Sudanese intelligence chief, Lt. Gen. Gutbi al-Mahdi, just days earlier — a meeting whose consequence even I did not fully grasp at the time:

…the purpose of my meeting [with al-Mahdi] was to see if we could glean any insights into the data Sudan has on those who have been attending the Popular Arab & Islamic Conference meetings convened by [Sudan's theological leader Hassan] Turabi. As you recall, during our August meeting, I told you I thought this data could be invaluable in genuinely assessing terrorism risk from Sudan and neighboring countries… His [al-Mahdi's] central contention is that Sudan is prepared to share data on those people attending the conferences and belonging to banned groups, such as Hamas, Hezbollah, Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Jamaah Islamiyah, and others, if we are prepared to genuinely engage and incent the Sudan away from its present course. He complained bitterly about repeated efforts to communicate with the administration, which are as I understand it, being blocked at very low levels because of what he called "blind spots."He showed me some files in which the data seemed pretty compelling — names, bio data like dates and places of birth, passport copies to show nationality, recent travel itineraries in some cases and a brief description of each individual to delineate which groups they claim loyalties to. In short, it seemed to me everything we discussed in August was available. Strongly suggest we test the Sudanese on the data, perhaps even try to get at the data on an unconditional basis…

Berger's secretary, Kris, confirmed he had received and read the memo. Berger's reply: We'll evaluate this after the election. Election day came and went. No action was taken.

APRIL 5, 1997. Sudan's president, Omar Hassan El Bashir, delivered to me a final, unconditional political offer, addressed to Rep. Lee Hamilton, to invite FBI and CIA officials to go to Khartoum and evaluate Sudanese intelligence data on terrorists that had lived in or passed through Sudan. The offer went without a reply even as Hamilton repeatedly queried Berger, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, and others about what was wrong with the offer and why it was not being evaluated more seriously. Correspondence in my files fully documents these events.

SEPTEMBER 28, 1997. Sudan's April policy shift to make cooperation on terrorism issues unconditional sparked a heated debate at the State Department, where foreign-service officers believed the U.S. should take a new approach to Khartoum, and lobbied the incoming Secretary of State — still untainted by her politicized and yet-to-be-confirmed staff — to have a fresh look. On September 28, after four months of deliberate and exhaustive interagency reviews, Sec. Albright announced that up to eight U.S. diplomats would return to Sudan to pressure its Islamic government to stop harboring Arab terrorists, and furthermore, to gather intelligence on terrorist groups operating out of Sudan — including Hezbollah, Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad.

OCTOBER 1, 1997. As the reengagement policy was taking shape, Rice, the incoming Assistant Secretary for East Africa, informally confronted the same foreign-service officers who had recommended returning diplomats to Sudan to Albright and vowed that the new policy directive would not stand. On October 1, State Department spokesman Jamie Rubin sheepishly announced an abrupt reversal of the September 28 Albright decision. Rice was confirmed by the Senate on October 9, 1997. To this day, neither Berger nor Albright nor Rice have explained to the American people why a deliberative decision of the U.S. government, made through interagency review, was overturned in such a cavalier fashion by a narrow clique of Clinton advisers when Sudan's April offer to cooperate on terrorism issues had been made unconditionally.

SEPTEMBER 12, 1997 and DECEMBER 5, 1997. On the very day Rice was delivering testimony for her Senate confirmation, Sudan's ambassador to the U.S., Mahdi Ibrahim, met with David Williams, special agent in charge of the FBI's Middle East and North Africa Department. Faced with the growing prospect that political reconciliation was impossible with forces at the National Security Council and State Department lined up adamantly against Sudan, Ibrahim decided to take matters directly to the intelligence community and discuss how the FBI could take advantage of Sudan's offer to cooperate independently of the administration. A second, and critically important, meeting took place on December 5.

FEBRUARY 5, 1998. On the basis of those two FBI meetings in Washington, Sudan's intelligence chief, al-Mahdi, made a final, almost desperate attempt to reach out to U.S. intelligence officials in order to turn over data on the people and evidence of their planning against U.S. targets in the region. He wrote officially to Williams "…with reference to your meeting with Ambassador Mahdi Ibrahim on Sept. 12 and Dec. 5 1997, I would like to express my sincere desire to start contacts and cooperation between our service and the FBI…" The letter was sent at the very moment that Iraq was reaching out to al Qaeda leaders resident in Khartoum. Did al-Mahdi know something serious was amiss in the radical Islamist community he was closely monitoring? Apparently so. He would later recount to Vanity Fair correspondent David Rose in a January 2002 expose that had the FBI come to Khartoum in February 1998 to analyze the data on terrorists Khartoum was actively monitoring, the U.S. embassy bombings would probably not have occurred.

FEBRUARY 19, 1998. Iraqi intelligence plans the trip of a senior al Qaeda operative and trusted bin Laden aide to visit Baghdad.

MARCH 1998. The al Qaeda operative visits Baghdad for two weeks. The visit sets the stage for Farouk Hijazi to travel to bin Laden's Afghanistan hideouts in December 1998.

JUNE 24, 1998. Theoretically, the February Sudanese offer to the FBI should have been evaluated on merits that did not take the Clinton administration's political viewpoint on Sudan into consideration, particularly since it differed from President Bashir's April offer at a political level, in that it was made at an intelligence-to-intelligence level. After all, the U.S. executive branch is not supposed to interfere with the FBI's job. Or so we thought. On June 24, Williams finally replied to al-Mahdi "… I am not currently in a position to accept your kind invitation. I am hopeful that future circumstances might allow me to visit with you…." Future circumstances was code, as I found out later from career officials at State involved in the discussions at the time, for a point at which the politicizing that had come to characterize Clinton administration terrorism policies would end. Blockages created by State's East Africa department under Rice, and by Berger at the National Security Council, remained as both vehemently argued against allowing FBI delegations to visit Khartoum under any circumstances.

U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania were bombed six weeks later. Cruise-missile attacks against Sudan and Afghanistan, based on faulty and inaccurate intelligence, followed and ignited the fires burning inside radical Islam's criminal core. As we now know, planning for the September 11 attacks on America began soon thereafter.

I believe that as we continue to unravel the spaghetti strings that bound al Qaeda and Saddam's regime together in the coming months, we are going to learn that Iraq provided expertise, financial, logistical and intelligence support to al Qaeda terrorists in an unprecedented manner. The terrorists, emboldened by their state sponsorship, were able to then carry out their suicide missions almost with impunity.

The silence of Clinton officials charged with the responsibility of securing U.S. interests around the world, when faced with this compelling timeline of facts, is still deafening. The American people deserve candid answers for the difficult questions posed by their actions in addressing the growing threat of terrorism, and failing repeatedly to respond to meaningful offers of assistance from the very nations who because of their sponsorship of terrorism, best understood those who rose up to attack us.

— Mansoor Ijaz, chairman of Crescent Investment Management in New York and an NRO contributor, negotiated as a private citizen the Sudan's offer to share intelligence data on al Qaeda, bin Laden, and other terrorist groups with the Clinton administration in April 1997.

Neil__
07-09-2003, 01:51 PM
If this evidece of Arming, funding and training is true it could justify the war.
If only clinton hadn'd shared a bed with Al Qaeda.
It's hard for them to use it concidering.


Neil

j2k4
07-09-2003, 02:13 PM
Originally posted by Neil__@9 July 2003 - 08:51
If this evidece of Arming, funding and training is true it could justify the war.
If only clinton hadn'd shared a bed with Al Qaeda.
It's hard for them to use it concidering.


Neil
Could you clarify that, Neil?

Neil__
07-09-2003, 03:02 PM
well you mention that the evidence for sadam and al qaeda is out there to be found
and that being true then evidence of that sort would have made an attack on
sadam much more justified.
and absolutely Justified if any help went into the twin towers

either way you look at it if you pry into the training of terrorists there is a danger of unveiling the special relationships that have existed between Sadam , bin laden and America

but is the american government worried that the links between the
Clinton government and bin laden will show that they could have avoided the attacks on 911 if the link was that close.

Or was clinton trying to make way for a diplomatic sollution
and somehow Bin Laden felt betrayed.

this above 2 examples are conspiracy theory but any link in the past will demand investigation

And that cannot be in America's interests

Neil

TheDave
07-09-2003, 03:36 PM
i kinda lost interest when it said dynamic duo and stopped believing when it said the stuff was found in rubble :rolleyes: .

j2k4
07-09-2003, 04:09 PM
My point was only to refute those who deny, with absolute certainty (but no proof), that an Iraq/al Qaeda link exists.

Past involvements of an extremely ill-advised nature between the U.S. and Saddam/OBL etc., have been openly acknowledged here by me many times-two things:

1) They were not then (at the time of these "collaborations") what they came to be.

2) Dwelling in the past has gone beyond merely moronic to being outright dangerous.

As far as Clinton goes, the only person capable of de-mystifying his administration's actions (or lack of same) vis a vis OBL and/or Iraq is Clinton himself, and he ain't talking.

TheDave
07-09-2003, 04:19 PM
dont have a clue what your saying but doesnt al-qaeda make an enemy of Saddam's regime for some of the same reasons they oppose the western world

Eugenius
07-09-2003, 04:26 PM
"The unearthing of documents directly linking Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda organization to Saddam Hussein this weekend may have hermetically sealed the Bush administration's case that dismantling Iraq's Baathist enterprise was in part necessary to undo terrorism's dynamic duo."

give me a fuckin break.
"oh, we can't find WMDs so let's now concentrate on documents found linking Iraq to Al Qaeda". please!

i've got yr link right here:

IRAQ
AL QAEDA

j2k4
07-09-2003, 04:33 PM
Originally posted by Eugenius@9 July 2003 - 11:26
"The unearthing of documents directly linking Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda organization to Saddam Hussein this weekend may have hermetically sealed the Bush administration's case that dismantling Iraq's Baathist enterprise was in part necessary to undo terrorism's dynamic duo."

give me a fuckin break.
"oh, we can't find WMDs so let's now concentrate on documents found linking Iraq to Al Qaeda". please!

i've got yr link right here:

IRAQ
AL QAEDA
I think you'll find the date of Mr. Ijaz's column predates the present uproar over WMD; in any case, as I have also said, I posted it in aid of another point, which you have apparently missed.

j2k4
07-09-2003, 04:44 PM
Originally posted by TheDave@9 July 2003 - 11:19
doesnt al-qaeda make an enemy of Saddam's regime for some of the same reasons they oppose the western world
If they do, it is definitely not for the same reasons, and is also not to any degree approaching their hatred, not of the western world per se, but of the U.S., as it is perceived as constituting the "western world".

Let's be perfectly clear: Where terrorists are concerned, western world=United States.

This is not to also mention the fact that (arab) blood is thicker than water.

BTW-there actually exist people who are surprised at the al Qaeda bombings in Saudi Arabia and Morocco.

A bit naive, I think?

TheDave
07-09-2003, 04:50 PM
Originally posted by j2k4+9 July 2003 - 16:44--></div><table border='0' align='center' width='95%' cellpadding='3' cellspacing='1'><tr><td>QUOTE (j2k4 @ 9 July 2003 - 16:44)</td></tr><tr><td id='QUOTE'> <!--QuoteBegin-TheDave@9 July 2003 - 11:19
doesnt al-qaeda make an enemy of Saddam&#39;s regime for some of the same reasons they oppose the western world

If they do, it is definitely not for the same reasons, and is also not to any degree approaching their hatred, not of the western world per se, but of the U.S., as it is perceived as constituting the "western world".

Let&#39;s be perfectly clear: Where terrorists are concerned, western world=United States.

This is not to also mention the fact that (arab) blood is thicker than water.

BTW-there actually exist people who are surprised at the al Qaeda bombings in Saudi Arabia and Morocco.

A bit naive, I think? [/b][/quote]
nice little bunch of contradictions you have their :blink:

j2k4
07-09-2003, 04:51 PM
How so, Dave?

TheDave
07-09-2003, 04:59 PM
well, you say what i mean by western world is United states which it aint theyre against the whole thing particularly the US.

then you say (arab)blood is thicker than water, but people are suprised by the bombings in saudi arabia and morocco

im sorry i keep hitting reply with good arguements in mind then forget em :(

j2k4
07-09-2003, 05:11 PM
Originally posted by TheDave@9 July 2003 - 11:59
well, you say what i mean by western world is United states which it aint theyre against the whole thing particularly the US.

then you say (arab)blood is thicker than water, but people are suprised by the bombings in saudi arabia and morocco

im sorry i keep hitting reply with good arguements in mind then forget em :(
I see your point; sorry for the lack of clarity.

Let&#39;s try this:

If it weren&#39;t for the U.S., "western world" would be only an indicator as to geographic locale; nothing more.


QUOTE
then you say (arab)blood is thicker than water, but people are suprised by the bombings in saudi arabia and morocco
QUOTE

I try here to point out the irony of citing people&#39;s opinion that, while all the parties involved are Arab, the supposition that they are "of a piece" is ultimately falacious; al Qaeda will strike even friends, if they perceive the need to "warn"-they are beholden to no one, and I think the Saudis, in particular, were surprised to find themselves targeted.

Does this help?

Rat Faced
07-09-2003, 08:20 PM
Let&#39;s be perfectly clear: Where terrorists are concerned, western world=United States.



j2k4,

I actually dont know whether to laugh or cry at this statement.

The USA has probably had less terrorism in its country than any other Western nation.

OK, there have been attacks abroad on many occasions, but same goes for the rest of us.


As to the link between Iraq/Al Qeada.....I never denied a link, just the spin.

The whitehouses own website said that Al Qeada training camps and members were hidden in the NORTH of Iraq...ie the area controlled by the Kurds, NOT Hussain.

So, was Hussain getting into bed with Al Qeada...and by default the Kurds?

Wasnt his treatment of the Kurds another argument for going to war?



Evidence "found in rubble" is the type of "evidence" that we are beginning to expect will be found.

Have you ever seen whats left of a building hit as hard as the Intelligence HQ was? There certainly would not be full "documentary evidence" lying around...just a little scrap of paper here and another there..mostly burnt almost beyond all recognition.



On the other matter of Sudan.....I have to agree that only total incompetance passes up the chance of intelligence in Government.

Its AFTER its received that you decide what value to place on it....even if disregarded entirely at the time (which would have been wrong) it would exist NOW, as the evidence needed for the link.

It looks to me, both here and also the intelligence leading up to 9/11, that the US administartion is interfering TOO much with the US security services, and totally screwing it up...this is a shame, as the CIA/FBI/NSA are the ones that get to carry the can for the ameteurs that are elected/appointed.

j2k4
07-10-2003, 04:20 AM
Originally posted by Rat Faced@9 July 2003 - 15:20

Let&#39;s be perfectly clear: Where terrorists are concerned, western world=United States.



j2k4,

I actually dont know whether to laugh or cry at this statement.

The USA has probably had less terrorism in its country than any other Western nation.

Once again, sorry for the lack of clarity:

As Israel is reserved a special "hatred" by terrorists, could it not be said the U.S., by virtue of it&#39;s alliance with Israel, is thought of similarly?

I didn&#39;t mean to imply the U.S. is the only target of western-directed terrorism, but I do think we more clearly personify what they seem to hate, especially since our urge to "interfere" is so intrusive.

We certainly haven&#39;t suffered the sheer numbers of incidents other countries have; 9/11 doesn&#39;t change that fact.

I don&#39;t recall your questioning the Iraq/al Qaeda link, Rat.

MagicNakor
07-10-2003, 05:38 AM
Reply bumping...

:ninja:

j2k4
07-10-2003, 12:32 PM
Originally posted by MagicNakor@10 July 2003 - 00:38
Reply bumping...

:ninja:
Thanks, MN.

I do like to stay squared away with Brother Rat- ;)

Neil__
07-10-2003, 04:06 PM
Let&#39;s be perfectly clear: Where terrorists are concerned, western world=United States.
I am in "the western world" and I am deffinately not American.

We have similar values but America takes them to an extreme other western countries are uncomfortable with, so claiming to be some sort of standard
is quite arogant.
America is not in the majority it is just the most powerful.
that aside it must feel like your the BUT of it all.
but in some ways America has provoked a lot of countries and it is for this reason
America has become such a target. If you hold yourself up as the self appointed police of the planet then the "buck" stops with you.



It doesn&#39;t mean if America is targetted we aren&#39;t appaled because we are.
Were just not supprised thats all.

Although the attack on the twin towers was so personal to America it doesn&#39;t mean it wasn&#39;t an attack on us all in the west.
so specificall to this incident you have a point. but not in general.

Neil

Rat Faced
07-10-2003, 04:19 PM
J2k4,

If you are defining terrorism as "Islamic Fundamentalist" organisations only, then I&#39;d agree...USA and Israel have a special place in their hearts.

Terrorism generally though...no, USA has less than most.


I&#39;ve often questioned the link between Hussain and Al Qaeda, as they hate each other.....Hussain wasnt just a secular ruler (which is fundamentally opposed to Al Qaeda&#39;s beliefs, like every western democracy)...He was an ISLAMIC secular ruler, ie a Traitor to their version of Islam.

He was probably the only thing in the world that they hated MORE than USA/Israel..most terrorism in Iraq was carried out by Al Qaeda/Kurds.


Every "link" so far has been disproven...and I expect this will also be disproven (even if by an Investigative Reporter in 10 years...I remember the crap the CIA received off Bush when they disproved the "links" provided by Mossad, so i doubt they will try and disprove it themselves this time)

Neil__
07-10-2003, 04:30 PM
Rat Faced

You have a real point there I haven&#39;t thought of the abuse of islam and Bin ladens
Muslim Extrememism (not to be confused with fundamentalism which is back to basics sort of)

Would have Bin Laden and Al Qaeda concidered sadam as an Islamic traitor.
and does that mean Al Qaeda would have shunned money and weapons
when desperately needed or was the need to fight America more important than the need to fight Sadam.

Makes a collusion unlikely but would "the greater good of Al Qaeda" be served better by taking help. from sadam?

Neil.