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When Microsoft spent $100 million to develop its Internet browser and included it in Windows free of charge, to Judge Jackson that showed monopoly power and hurt competition. But why would a monopoly have to blow $100 million to improve its product?
I rather think the author has missed (or is it sidestepped) the point, I always thought the problem was that microsoft used their monopoly in one area to create a monopoly in another area. The inclusion of IE in windows was not to increase the windows share o fthe market, but rather to increase its share of the browser market. Microsoft gains the money of selling a browser automatically with sales of its other product by slipstreaming one into the other and also wiped out netscape which was its only real competition in the browser market. Just for the record i always thought navigator was way better than IE back in the day, though at the time i was a total internet noob. :D
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By mid-1995, popular culture had begun to notice the World Wide Web. Netscape Navigator was the de facto standard for web browsing at that time; its competition consisted only of a few browsers such as Mosaic and Lynx which were being developed on university campuses. Microsoft saw the success of Netscape and recognized the potential of the web, and licensed Mosaic as the basis of Internet Explorer 1.0 which it released as part of the Microsoft Windows 95 Plus Pack in August 1995. Internet Explorer 2.0 was released three months later, and by then the race was on.
New versions of Netscape Navigator (later Netscape Communicator) and Internet Explorer were released at a rapid pace over the following few years. Features often took priority over bug fixes, and therefore the browser wars were a time of unstable browsers, frequent crashes, security holes, and lots of user headaches. Internet Explorer only began to approach its competition with version 3.0 (1996), which offered scripting support and the market's first commercial cascading style sheets implementation.
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Microsoft had two strong advantages in the browser wars. One was simply an issue of resources: Netscape began with near-90% market share and a good deal of public goodwill, but as a relatively small company deriving the great bulk of its income from what was essentially a single product (Navigator and its derivatives), it was financially vulnerable. Netscape's total revenue never exceeded the interest income generated by Microsoft's cash on hand.
The other, more important, advantage was that Microsoft Windows had a monopoly in the operating system marketplace and could be used to leverage IE to a dominant position. IE was bundled with every copy of Windows; therefore, even though early versions of IE were markedly inferior to Netscape's browser, Microsoft was still able to grow its market share. And IE remained free while the enormous revenues from Windows were used to fund its development and marketing, resulting in rapid improvements until it was so similar to Netscape that users had no desire to download and install Netscape.
Other Microsoft actions also hurt Netscape, such as:
Netscape's business model was to give away its browser but sell server software. Microsoft understood this and attacked Netscape's revenue sources, bundling Microsoft's Internet Information Server web server "free" with server versions of Windows, and offering Microsoft customers workalike clones of Netscape's proxy server, mail server, news server, and other software free or at steep discounts. This didn't have much effect at first, as much of Netscape's revenues came from customers using Sun Microsystems servers, but the gradual result was to make Windows NT more popular as a server for Internet and intranet while cutting off Netscape's income.
Microsoft created licensing agreements with computer manufacturers requiring them to provide desktop icons for IE, while penalizing them for shipping Netscape on their computers.
Microsoft made it very easy for small and medium ISPs to release branded versions of Internet Explorer, and with few exceptions they did, meaning that users of many ISPs were encouraged to use Internet Explorer and not Netscape.
Microsoft created a licensing agreement with AOL to base AOL's primary interface on IE rather than Netscape.
Microsoft purchased and released a web authoring tool, FrontPage, that tended to create pages that looked better in IE.
Microsoft included support for CSS in IE and made IE more tolerant than Netscape of poorly-constructed HTML (such as generated by some web authoring tools). Some web designers found it easier to write their pages for IE only than to fix bad HTML or to support Netscape's LAYER extensions.
The effect of these actions were to "cut off Netscape's air supply," as stated by a Microsoft executive during the Microsoft antitrust case, and this (together with several bad business decisions on Netscape's part) led to Netscape's defeat by the end of 1998, after which the company was acquired by America Online for USD $4.2 billion. Internet Explorer became the new dominant browser, and has since attained 96% of the web browser market share, more than Netscape ever had at its peak.
Microsoft's actions also earned it two prosecutions for antitrust violations, both of them involving Microsoft's use of its monopoly status to manipulate the market.
The browser wars ended when Internet Explorer ceased to have any serious competition for its market share. This also brought an end to the rapid innovation in web browsers; there have been no new versions of Internet Explorer since version 6.0, released in 2001 (which itself was little different from version 5.5, as the main purpose of version 6.0 was to bundle it with Windows XP).