Greater endorsement of CTs [Conspiracy Theories] has been observed in
people who engage in less analytical and more intuitive reasoning modes (Barron et al., 2018; Georgiou, Delfabbro, & Balzan, 2019; Lantian, Bagneux, Delouvée, & Gauvrit, 2021; Swami, Voracek, Stieger, Tran, & Furnham, 2014).
Reasoning biases observed in delusions, which are distinct yet related phenomena, may also be relevant (e.g. Bronstein, Everaert, Castro, Joormann, & Cannon, 2019). While delusions involve a narrower definition of counterparties and are more personally targeted, what they share with CTs is
combining seemingly unrelated phenomena into meaningful patterns even if there are none.
Delusion-associated biases such as
jumping-to-conclusions (JTC bias; e.g. Dudley & Over, 2003),
liberal acceptance (LA bias, a lowered decision threshold; Moritz & Woodward, 2004),
bias against disconfirmatory evidence (BADE; Woodward, Buchy, Moritz, & Liotti, 2007) and an
excessive confidence in a belief with no ‘possibility of being mistaken’ (PM; Garety et al., 2005; So et al., 2012) might be also associated with the endorsement of coronavirus-related CTs.
[...]
Our hypotheses that
reasoning aberrations and paranoia are associated with coronavirus-related conspiracy beliefs were largely supported.
People endorsing such beliefs tend to collect less information before making a decision (JTC bias),
make judgments with low-to-moderate certainty (LA bias), and
adhere more to an already held specific belief, even if this turns out to be invalid (BADE) compared to people who endorse these beliefs to a lesser degree.
en(un)lightened
sex a wolf in a bag
BT Rep: +70
Helter Skelter
Hung Like A Horse
.
Persona non grata
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